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NOTES AND COMMENTS
HASTE MAKES FOR WORSE THAN WASTE
Scarcely a single day passes without some reference in the metropolitan
newspapers to the "dope evil" or the "narcotics problem," for recent
years have disclosed an appalling increase in the illegal use of narcotic
drugs and a rising curve in the number of addicts. Worse yet, the age-level
of those involved, both peddlers and consumers, has declined until the
matter has now become one of those teen-age phenomena, one of those fads
and fancies, which would border on the ridiculous if it were not for the
tragic consequences so frequently found to follow in the train of drug
addiction. From the smoking of marijuana on a "dare" to a steadily
increasing consumption of heroin as the strength of the addiction grows
leads but naturally to larceny, robbery and even more serious crime in
order that the addict might secure the money to purchase larger and still
larger quantities of "dope." Annual statistics relating to crime are not
needed to arouse the citizenry in every large community to clamor for
action, for law enforcing agencies, from police departments on down, have
combined their talents, strength and energy to stamp out the drug evil.
The issue is not one new to lawyers and lawmakers, for, in addition to
a federal Harrison Act' and a federal drug Export and Import Act, 2 many
states enacted varying state laws on the subject.' The federal statutes,
however, were primarily aimed at the production of revenue, although
criminal sanctions were imposed on all who possessed or dispensed drugs
without license or the payment of taxes, so local enforcement directed
against addiction naturally varied from state to state. As usage of narcotic
drugs became more and more a national problem, with corresponding
entanglement of social and economic factors, the need for uniform state
law became apparent.
With customary vigor, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws addressed
themselves to the challenge and, in 1932, drafted a Uniform Narcotic Drug
Act.4 It would be difficult, wrote the Commissioners, for "one not familiar
126 U. S. C. A. § 2550 et seq.
2 21 U. S. C. A. § 171 et seq.
3 Illinois, for example, enacted a narcotics law in 1931: Laws 1931, p. 455. It
was repealed in 1935, and replaced by the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1, et seq. The Illinois statute, prior to amendment,
varied from the uniform law in a few particulars not here pertinent. As to its
constitutionality, see People v. Guagliata, 362 Ill.
427, 200 N. E. 169, 103 A. L. R.
1035 (1936).
4 See

9A Unif. Laws Anno., pp. 182-224.
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with the subject to understand how many different organizations and
associations have an interest in the provisions of" the proposed act. It had
to "protect those using narcotic drugs legally, as well as provide punishment for those using such drugs illegally." Great care "had to be exercised
not to violate" treaty provisions regarding traffic in drugs, but at the
same time to permit some leeway to the individual states to provide their
"own methods for the care and cure of addicts. "5 In general, therefore,
the proposed uniform law was directed against those who illegally sold,
prescribed, administered, or dispensed narcotic drugs but the illegal possessor, manufacturer or compounder thereof was not overlooked. Punishment
by fine or imprisonment, in varying amounts and for varying terms, in
either local jails or state penitentiaries, was recommended as a suitable
penalty. The comprehensive and carefully thought out uniform statute
drafted by these Commissioners proved to be so acceptable to the state
legislatures that, between 1932 and 1945, it was substituted for local
variants in forty-five jurisdictions.G
The wisdom underlying the enactment of legislation of this type should
be obvious to all. No one, in his right mind, would challenge either the
motives or the sincerity of purpose of those who worked to put the measure
on the statute books of the nation. For that matter, few would care to
question the expertness of the draftsmanship to be found in the uniform
law nor the successful culmination of the five years of careful thought and
consideration which went into its makeup. One may, however, well express
alarm when heedless individuals, whipped to a furor because of failure in
law enforcement, rush headlong into the danger of ill-conceived and poorly
thought out amendment, hastily enacted, of so well received a measure.
Public discussion then becomes the citizen's duty in a democracy where
freedom to think, speak and join in argument forms a cardinal principle
of government, even though it be to think, speak and argue on the illfavored side of the question.
Illinois has just experienced an illustration of the devastating consequences which can follow upon an unthinking, headlong, blind rush into
legislative action at a time when few would wish to be quoted as being
opposed to the spirit underlying the militant demand of organized pressure
7
groups. In just thirty-seven days from the date of introduction to passage,
5

Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 9A Unif.

Laws Anno., pp. 183-4.
6 9A Unif. Laws Anno., p. 182.
7 House Bill No. 544 was introduced on March 28, 1951. It cleared both House
and Senate by May 3, 1951, and, being declared to be an emergency measure, was
placed in operation promptly upon the Governor's approval. Speed of passage can
be best judged by noting that a bill must be read at large on three different days
in both branches of the General Assembly and must be printed before a final vote
is taken: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III, § 13.
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House Bill No. 544 has been added to existing legislation on the subject.
Omitting stylistic phraseology, it reads:
"Section 1. Section 23 of the "Uniform Narcotic Drug Act," approved
July 8, 1935, as amended, is amended to read as follows: Section 23. Whoever violates this Act by selling, prescribing, administering or dispensing
any narcotic drug, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of
not less than one year nor more than five years for the first offense. Whoever
violates this Act by possessing, having under his control, manufacturing
or compounding any narcotic drug shall be fined for the first offense not
more than $5,000.00, or be imprisoned for a period of not less than one
year nor more than five years, or both. For any subsequent offense the
violator shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term from two
years to life.
"Whoever violates this Act by selling, prescribing, administering, or dispensing any narcotic drug to any person under 21 years of age, shall be
imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term from two years to life.
"Whoever is authorized in this Act to manufacture, possess, have under
his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic
drug, who violates this Act by failing to comply with any provision prescribed in this Act for the exercise of such authority, for a first offense,
shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or be imprisoned in the county jail
for a term of not more than one year, or both; and for any subsequent
offense shall be fined not more than $3,000.00 or be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of not more than five years, or both.
"Any offense under this Act shall be deemed a subsequent offense if the
violator shall have been previously convicted of a felony under any law
of the United States of America, or of any State or Territory or of the
District of Columbia relating to narcotic drugs. ' s
There is occasion to express grave doubts about the constitutionality of the
measure 9 as well as to note no small amount of unconstitutionality in its
enforcement. 10
S

Section 2 of House Bill No. 544, being the emergency clause, has been omitted.

9 It being understood that the Governor had requested an opinion with regard

thereto from the Attorney General, which request was probably made pursuant to
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 14, § 4, inquiry was addressed to the latter for a
copy of such opinion. The Attorney General replied to the effect that his opinion
was a confidential communication to the chief executive of the state and not a
matter of public concern unless released by the Governor. A similar request to the
Governor was rejected.
10 Chicago newspapers have reported at least two sentences to five-year terms in
the city prison imposed by the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago. The jurisdiction of that court, for a single offense, is limited to "imprisonment otherwise than
In the penitentiary." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357. To support imprisonment in the penitentiary, prosecution must be by indictment of a grand jury,
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Examination of the uniform law discloses that the substantive definition of all offenses thereunder is provided by Sections 2, 3, 13 and 17
thereof and Section 20, equivalent to Section 23 of the Illinois version, was
reserved for the purpose of prescribing the penalties and nothing more.
There could be no constitutional criticism addressed to legislative action
designed to increase the penalties for violation of the substantive provisions,
provided the increased penalties were not given retroactive effect," but
House Bill No. 544 does not stop at that point. True, it does, in general,
increase the penalty for selling, prescribing, administering, or dispensing
any narcotic drug illegally to a present penalty of not less than one year
nor more than five years in the penitentiary where formerly the statute
called for a penalty by way of a maximum fine of $1,000.00 or imprisonment in the county jail for no longer than one year, or both fine and
imprisonment. The addition of certain habitual offender provisions may or
may not be objectionable depending on whether the prior conviction was
had before or after the effective date of the amended statute. 12 Since the
13
holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of People v. Poppe, it
would probably be futile to claim unconstitutionality in the addition of a
paragraph defining the habitual offender as one who has previously been
convicted of a felony "under any law of the United States of America, or
of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia relating to narcotic
drugs," although interpretation may become necessary to decide .whether
''conviction" requires imprisonment in a penitentiary or not. 14 The chief
vice, however, exists in certain other ideas injected into the phraseology
of Section 23 as amended.
In the first place, a special and a new provision has been made for the
offender guilty of "selling, prescribing, administering, or dispensing any
narcotic drug to any person under 21 years of age" by fixing a minimum
sentence of two years in the penitentiary with a maximum life sentence, in
contrast to the general condemnation against selling, prescribing, administering or dispensing with its term of not less than one year nor more than
five years for a first offense. Nowhere in the substantive provisions of the
according to Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8, rather than by information or complaint,
for the offense is then of the grade of felony: Baits v. People, 123 I1. 428, 16 N. E.
483 (1888). There would seem to be a lack of jurisdiction to impose sentences of
the kind noted.
11111. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 14, contains the customary guarantee against ex post
facto legislation. No violation of U. S. Const., Amend. VIII, forbidding "cruel and
unusual punishment," would appear to be involved.
12 In People v. Hanke, 389 Ill. 602, 60 N. E. (2d) 395 (1945), it was held not to
be objectionable to include a new offense in the category of habitual offenses even
though the same was not so included at the time of the prior conviction.
13394 Ill. 216, 68 N. E. (2d) 254 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrEw
157.
14 See People v. Iagiello, 403 Ill. 623, 87 N. E. (2d) 785 (1949).
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statute is there any specific condemnation of the conduct as it might relate
to victims "under 21 years of age." The absurdity of a statute calling for
a punishment without designating a crime calls for no added comment. 15
Even supposing the imposition of a different penalty to be constitutional, there is still the question of the appropriateness of the system of
classification chosen by the legislature. The need for providing protection
to minors, in contrast to saving adults from harm, might well justify the
imposition of a heavier penalty on those who endanger the youthful portion
of the population. But has the legislature, in its haste, forgotten that
females become of age, in Illinois, for virtually every purpose, 6 when
they attain eighteen? If the amendment to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
has not changed the status of a female between eighteen and twenty-one,
the indefiniteness and confusion generated should alone be enough to make
the amendment void.
Again, whether by accident or design, the word "knowingly" has been
omitted from the sentence in Section 23 which deals with the punishment
to be imposed on one who possesses, has under his control, manufactures
or compounds any narcotic drug. Whether accidental or deliberate, the
omission would be just as deadly to validity. In People v. Edge,17 a prosecution based upon an alleged violation of the statute forbidding the possession of policy tickets,' 8 the conviction was reversed because of a failure to
charge that the policy-playing tickets were knowingly possessed. In that
regard, the court noted that the word "knowingly" is not supplied, in
substance, by the term "unlawfully." It said: "Inclusion of the word
'unlawfully' merely connotes that the possession was contrary to or in
defiance of law, whereas 'knowingly' implies that the act was performed
consciously, intelligently, and with actual knowledge of the facts . . ."19
Similarly, in People v. Beak,20 where the constitutionality of a criminal
statute was the prime issue, the court said that "in creating an offense by
statute which was not a crime at common law such statute must be sufficiently certain to show what the legislature intended to prohibit and
punish, otherwise it will be void for uncertainty . . . If the law is of such

doubtful construction and describes the act denominated as a crime in
terms so general and indeterminate as to make the question of criminality
15 Compare, for example, the instant measure with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1,
Ch. 38, § 490, dealing with a contrast between the common law offense of forcible
rape and statutory rape, involving offenders and victims at varying age levels.
16 An exception existing in connection with the right to vote, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 3-1, rests on other grounds. A female, at eighteen, is qualified to
serve as a notary public, for example: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 99, § 1.
17 406 Ill. 490, 94 N. E. (2d) 359 (1950).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 413.
19 406 Ill.
490 at 494, 94 N. E. (2d) 359 at 361.
20291 Ill. 449, 126 N. E, 201 (1920).
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dependent upon the opinions of ... individuals ... and of such a nature
that honest and intelligent men are unable to ascertain what particular act
is condemned .. .the law is incapable of enforcement and will be held to
be null and void. "21 True, a presumption of constitutionality attends upon
every legislative enactment, but it would not be thought to be strong
enough to overcome the effect of the obvious error committed at this point.
A further point might be made of the fact that the statute, as amended,
fails to specify the place of detention where the optional sentence of
imprisonment, which may be imposed on those who are found guilty of
illegal possession of narcotic drugs, is to be served. In all other instances,
there is express declaration that the term of imprisonment is to be "in the
penitentiary," except as to those who, authorized to possess and use drugs,
should fail to comply with the provisions regarding licensing, labelling, and
record keeping. 22 Unless this failure may be said to be remedied by other
general provisions in the statute book, 23 there would seem to be further
obvious uncertainty to a degree warranting a determination of unconstitutionality, for no one can say whether the legislature intended to treat the
offense as a felony or a misdemeanor. When the requirements of criminal
procedure are kept in mind, 24 there is some occasion to believe that the
proponents of the amendment, in their zeal to sharpen the teeth of the
law, have overreached themselves. They have, in fact, endangered the
whole scheme of the uniform law for, admitting the presence of a saving
clause, 25 a determination that Section 23, as amended, is unconstitutional
would leave the statute wide open to criticism as being nothing more than
another utopian scheme lacking in practical effect.
While opinions may not differ as to the wisdom of seeking a change
in existing law, if in fact it is inadequate to suppress the evil of traffic
in, and use of, narcotic drugs, one may well be entitled to criticize the
efforts of zealots, no matter how much they may be appalled by the
increasing use of narcotic drugs, if their combined pressures have left the
state exposed to the danger of being without any relief short of a special
291 Ill. 449 at 452, 126 N. E. 201 at 202.
First offenders in that category are to be fined or "be imprisoned in the county
jail."
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 585, declares a felony to be an offense
21

22

"punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary." Other offenses, by
Section 586, are declared to be misdemeanors.
24 Prosecution for felony must be by indictment, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 8, hence
must be heard only before the several circuit courts or by the Criminal Court of
Cook County: People v. Glowacki, 236 Ill.
612, 86 N. E. 368 (1908).
25 Section 22 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act provides that "if any provision
of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid,
such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act, which
can be given effect ... and to this end the provisions of the act are declared to be
severable." See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.25.
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session of the legislature to provide the serious consideration the matter
deserves. They ought to bear in mind Chief Justice Hughes' injunction
to "look after the courts of the poor, who stand most in need of justice,"
for it is before such tribunals that drug peddlers and addicts most frequently appear. They need to be cautioned that the "security of the
republic will be found in the treatment of the poor and ignorant; in
indifference to their misery and helplessness lies disaster."
DANmEL A. WoLi*

THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR ESTATE,
GIFT AND INCOME TAX PURPOSES
Every student of economics fully realizes the fact that the value of
property is never constant at all times, being materially, and often seriously, affected by periods of depression and recession as well as by those of
inflationary character. For this reason, and because many transfers of
property occur in the form of transfers in kind rather than in cash, it is
often difficult, but highly important from the tax standpoint, to arrive at an
accurate and proper valuation of property passing by way of inheritance,
gift or otherwise.' As rules governing valuation vary with the type of
property involved, rather than with the type of tax to be assessed, it is
possible to consider such rules without particular reference to either estate,
gift or income forms of taxation. For that matter, few instances exist
where litigated questions concerning the valuation of property have turned
on matters of law, for valuation is primarily a fact question to be resolved
under the circumstances of the given case and to be decided upon the basis
of the particular evidence produced. The essence of a case involving property valuation, then, is not the putting up of a strong legal argument but
the proper presentation of all the relevant facts, strengthened by all
pertinent data and buttressed by the use of opinion evidence furnished
by those specialists whose expertness is beyond question.
The essential inquiry turns on the "fair market value" of the property
on the taxable date. In general, that "fair market value" has been said
to be the "price which would probably be agreed upon by a seller
* LL.B., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1919; Member, Illinois bar.
1 In most instances income, for income tax purposes, is payable in cash and
presents no valuation problem. Valuation may become a necessary step to a
determination of taxable income where: (1) compensation, dividends or rents are
payable in the form of property other than cash; (2) there is a distribution of
stock rights; or (3) property is received by a shareholder upon liquidation of a
corporation. Valuation problems could also arise in connection with an excess
profits tax.
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willing, but under no compulsion, to sell, and a buyer willing, but
under no compulsion, to buy, where both have reasonable knowledge
of the facts. '"2 Factors to be taken into consideration, therefore, would
typically group around three centers, to-wit: (1) the existence of a market
for the property under consideration; (2) the representative character of
sales made on that market; and (3) similarities and dissimilarities between
the property so sold and the particular property in question. As valuation
is a fact question, determinable from all proper evidence adduced, the
Court of Appeals for the United States cannot question the determination,
nor substitute its own judgment as to valuation, if the facts found by the
Tax Court are supported by proper and substantial evidence, not even
when, in the opinion of the higher court, the evidence points to a different
conclusion. 3 It is obvious, therefore, that the principal effort should be put
forth before the issue of valuation reaches the appellate level.
While value, at any given time, is a "fact," it is based upon a number
of other facts such as the size, location and yield of real property, or the
presence or absence of corporate earnings in the case of shares of stock.
Despite its nature as a real, actual, definite thing, it is "an approximation,
a matter of opinion, a guess, although that of informed people," 4 hence
turns largely on opinion. Because opinions do frequently differ, valuations
based on substantial evidence are rarely rejected as courts are inclined to
respect the soundly-formed opinions of others. 5 Conversely, property is
rarely considered as being absolutely valueless, particularly for estate or
gift tax purposes.6
It should be noted, of course, that the burden of proof as to correct
and proper valuation lies on the taxpayer's shoulders. If the Commissioner
See also John J.
2 Phillips v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 598 at 601 (1926).
Newberry, 39 BTA 1123 (1939) ; Augustus E. Staley, 41 BTA 752 (1940), appeal dis.
C. C. A., 7th, 1940; and 28 U. S. C. A., §§ 11(b) ; 113(a) (4) ; 113(a) (5) ; 810-2; and
1005. For critical comment on the meaning of "value," see opinion of Frank, C. J.,
in Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 at 317 (1943).
3 Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 37, 57 S. Ct. 324, 81 L. Ed.
491 (1937) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289
(1931) ; F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 913 (1946) ; Seaside
Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 990 (1939), cert. den. 308 U. S. 618,
60 S. Ct. 263, 84 L. Ed. 516 (1939) ; Neal v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 806 (1931) ;
Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632, 53 S. Ct. 83,
77 L. Ed. 548 (1932) ; Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F. (2d) 191 (1928) ; James Couzens,
11 BTA 1040 (1928).
4 Montrose Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 238 (1939), affirmed in
309 U. S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 511, 84 L. Ed. 985 (1940). See also Heiner v. Gwinner,
114 F. (2d) 723 (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 714, 61 S. Ct. 396, 85 L. Ed. 465 (1940) ;
Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 748, 64 S. Ct.
51, 88 L. Ed. 444 (1943) ; Rockford Malleable Iron Works, 2 BTA 817 (1925).
5 Meadow Land & Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 124 F. (2d) 297 (1941).
6 Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, 51 S. Ct. 550, 75 L. Ed. 1143 (1931) ; Guggenheim
v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 469 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 621, 62 S. Ct. 66, 86 L.
Ed. 499 (1941).
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expresses disagreement, he has the power to redetermine value and the
resulting tax liability. For this purpose, he may have recourse to any
proper evidence tending to establish value, such as the opinions of expert
appraisers, reference to comparative sales, or purchase options given by
the taxpayer. In case he does, the taxpayer is handicapped, for the Commissioner's assessment is presumed to be correct and the taxpayer would
be forced to rebut the presumption. 7 To support a successful challenge
to the correctness of a deficiency assessment made by the Commissioner,
the taxpayer must produce evidence which would not only enable but also
require the Tax Court to make an independent determination on the facts,
particularly since, in the absence of such concrete facts, the presumption
of correctness favoring the Commissioner would not be overthrown.8
The burden of proof resting on the taxpayer would appear to be
heavier in the case of a suit to secure a tax refund than is true where
review is sought, in the Tax Court, on a redetermination of valuation.
Choice of procedure, therefore, should be given more than off-hand consideration. Negotiation of a closing agreement is possible where valuation
controversies have led to consummated transactions, but the Commissioner
will refuse to settle, as a matter of policy, where the proposed transaction
is only in the planning stage. 9 One further general fact should be noticed,
and that is the taxpayer should beware of the possibility of error in his
own valuation, for he will generally be bound by the figure he himself has
set' 0 and can obtain relief only where he clearly committed the error."
Proceeding now to specific illustrations regarding valuation problems,
attention is at once drawn to the fact that value must be determined as of
some particular date, the precise date depending on the purpose for the
valuation. The particular date may be important in determining the per7 Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 55 S. Ct. 287, 79 L. Ed. 623 (1935) ; Welch
v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 54 S. Ct. 8, 78 L. Ed. 212 (1933); Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F. (2d) 361 (1946) ; Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 314 (1943),
cert. den. 320 U. S. 748, 64 S. Ct. 51, 88 L. Ed. 444 (1943) ; Allen v. Commissioner,
117 F. (2d) 364 (1941); Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d)
990 (1939), cert. den. 308 U. S. 618, 60 S. Ct. 263, 84 L. Ed. 516 (1939) ; True v.
United States, 51 F. Supp. 720 (1943) ; Mimnaugh v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 411
(1928), cert. den. 280 U. S. 563, 50 S. Ct. 24, 74 L. Ed. 617 (1929) ; Anson v. Prouty,
5 BTA 107 (1926). See also Rule 32, Rules of Practice Before the Tax Court.
8 National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F. (2d) 39 (1943) ; Anthony P.
Miller, Inc., 7 T. C. 729 (1946), affirmed in 164 F. (2d) 268 (1947), cert. den. 333
U. S. 861, 68 S. Ct. 741, 92 L. Ed. 1140 (1948) ; Harriet A. Langdon, 7 BTA 1142
(1927).
9 26 U. S. C. A. § 3760.
10 Andrews v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 55 (1930) ; Thompson v. United States,
8 F. (2d) 175 (1925) ; Allie E. Nicholson, 21 BTA 795 (1930) ; Ethel P. Hunt, 12
BTA 396 (1928).
11Havemeyer v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 537 (1945), cert. den. 326 U. S. 759,
66 S. Ct. 138, 90 L. Ed. 456 (1945); Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll,
32 F. Supp. 661 (1940) ; Estate of W. E. Telling, T. D. Memo. 106694 (1944).
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centage of gain or loss arising from the sale of property acquired before
that date. It may have bearing on the value of the property, other than
cash, received as taxable income. In case of gift taxes, the precise date of
the gift might need to be determined. In estate tax cases, of course, the
controlling date is the date of death of the decedent whose estate is subject
to tax, unless the optional valuation date is utilized. Even though an appropriate date has been selected, the door is not closed to inquiry into future
developments occurring after that date, for valuation has sometimes been
based on prognostication as to future earnings or the prospects of future
growth of the community where the property is located, since these factors
have bearing on "fair market value.''12 Valuation generally, however, is
measured by factors then in existence.
Real estate valuation is usually achieved on the basis of opinion testimony furnished by qualified experts or on appraisals provided by qualified
appraisers. The expert or the appraiser must, of course, be shown to be
familiar not only with the particular property involved but also with other
properties of similar character. His opinion must also have been formulated
on the basis of a proper approach before it will be accepted. To find
recognition, the expert valuation should be predicated on facts not conclusions, on observable data and not "hunches."' u The size and shape of the
lot, its location, its actual or potential use, the footage fronting on important streets or avenues, the nature of zoning or similar restrictions, the
size, age, and nature of existing improvements together with their state
of repair or disrepair and their fitness for existing or particular uses, are
all elements having bearing on value. 14 Improved premises, of course,
should be valued as a unit for most purposes, although separate determinations as between the land value and the value of the improvements are
necessary for the calculation of depreciation in income tax matters. 1 5
In the absence of special controlling factors disclosed by the evidence, an
12 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151, 46 S. Ct. 291, 73 L. Ed. 647
(1929) ; Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 469 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S. 621,
62 S. Ct. 66, 86 L. Ed. 499 (1941) ; Portage Silica Co. v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d)
985 (1931), cert. den. 284 U. S. 667, 52 S. Ct. 42, 76 L. Ed. 565 (1931) ; Myer Dana,
30 BTA 83 (1934) ; James Couzens, 11 BTA 1040 (1928).
'3 F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 913 (1946) ; Phipps v.
Commissioner, 127 F. (2d) 214 (1942), cert. den. 317 U. S. 645, 63 S. Ct. 38, 87 L.
Ed. 519 (1942) ; First Nat. Bank of Memphis v. Commissioner, 125 F. (2d) 157
(1942) ; Heiner v. Gwinner, 114 F. (2d) 723 (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 714, 61 S.
Ct. 396, 85 L. Ed. 465 (1940); Belridge Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 85 F. (2d) 762
(1936) ; Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632,
53 S. Ct. 83, 77 L. Ed. 548 (1932) ; Boggs & Buhl, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 F. (2d)
859 (1929) ; Overlander v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 531 (1929) ; First Nat. Bank of
Birmingham (Schuler Trust), 29 BTA 352 (1933) ; Joseph J. Walsh, 7 BTA 1104
(1927).
14 Elizabeth P. Patterson, 33 BTA 57 (1935) ; John M. Galvin, 6 BTA 1085 (1927).
15 Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632, 53 S. Ct.
83, 77 L. Ed. 548 (1932).
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undivided fractional interest is usually valued at a proportionate share
of the value of the whole. 6
Comparative sales prices furnish desirable evidence of real estate
value, provided the test sales are not made under compulsion, because they
reflect the opinion of the market. 17 Offers to buy and sell, on the other
hand, have little bearing on the question of value, being no more than
evidence of the offeror's opinion on the point, hence will be regarded as
inadmissible evidence when standing alone. When supported by additional
evidence to the effect that the offer was made in good faith by a responsible
buyer possessed of a full knowledge of the facts, evidence of that character
may be received.' Rental value, or investment value, may not only be
relevant but may be decisive, for earning power may furnish a reliable
guide. 19 Assessed valuation may throw some light on the subject, but a
person relying thereon should be prepared to prove that the tax assessor's
judgment in the matter is based on full fair market value. 20 Book values,
or actual or replacement values, have sometimes been utilized, but again
21
they furnish inadequate proof unless tied up with fair value.
Special valuation problems are encountered, from the income tax
standpoint, in connection with mineral estates in land such as those relat.
ing to mines, oil and gas wells, and other natural resources,22 as well as
in the case of all types of tax where the interest acquired is less than a
fee simple. Leasehold interests may possess a value if there is an annual
saving arising from the ownership of the leasehold interest. Value is then
calculated on the basis of capitalizing the amount of the savings. But this
16 Adelaide McColgan, 10 BTA 958 (1928) ; Clifford A. Cook, 2 BTA 126 (1925)
Estate of Johnson, TO Memo. Dkt. No. 111795 (1943).
17 Tracy v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 575 (1931), cert. den. 287 U. S. 632, 53 S. Ct.
83, 77 L. Ed. 548 (1932) ; Huron Building Co., 15 BTA 1107 (1929).
18 Sharp v. United States, 191 U. S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211 (1903)
South Alabama Land Co. v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 27 (1930) ; Manufacturers
Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 684 (1937).
19 See cases cited in note 17, ante, and Montrose Cemetery Co. v. Commissioner,
105 F. (2d) 238 (1939), affirmed in 309 U. S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 511, 84 L. Ed. 985 (1940).
20 Tabor Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 34 F. (2d) 140 (1929).
21 Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S. 254, 61 S. Ct. 507, 85 L. Ed. 813 (1941)
Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 990 (1939), cert. den. 308
U. S. 618, 60 S. Ct. 263, 84 L. Ed. 516 (1939) ; South Alabama Land Co. v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 27 (1930) ; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d)
272 (1938) ; Henry Cleland Estate Co., 29 BTA 436 (1933) ; Estate of Jeremiah P.
Downing, 12 BTA 1180 (1928) ; Lexington Realty Co., 12 BTA 850 (1928) ; Jerecki
Mfg. Co., 12 BTA 165 (1928). For estate and gift tax purposes, only the net value
of the property transferred is taken into consideration as the taxpayer is entitled
to deduct the unpaid amount of any mortgage or other charge and, in the case of
estate taxes, all other debts and claims against the estate: Smith v. Shaughnessy,
318 U. S. 176, 63 S. Ct. 545, 87 L. Ed. 690 (1943).
22 For the law on this specialized subject, see Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 272 (1938) ; A. G. & S. Mining Co., 8 BTA 1260 (1927) ; Olinda
Land Co., TC Memo. Dkt. No. 23 (1945) ; and Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-7.
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is true only if the rights granted exceed, in value, the amount of the
payments required or other obligations imposed on the lessee, for otherwise
23
the leasehold interest would not possess a market value.
The valuation of personal property follows closely along the line
laid down for real estate valuation, the prime issue being to determine
the "fair market value" thereof on the controlling date. Most of the litigated questions, however, have arisen in connection with the valuation of
intangible personal property such as shares of stock, notes and mortgages.
Fair market value for such property, of course, is generally the amount of
cash which could be realized under a free and unhampered sale. 24 Active

listed securities typically will be valued on the basis of a mean between
the high and low prices recorded on the exchange on the particular day, or
on a date closest thereto, since the sales there recorded most closely reflect
the presence of a free market between willing sellers and buyers.
Inactive or unlisted issues are likely to present problems by reason
of the difficulty of finding an acceptable comparative basis. Other sales
made on days too remote from the valuation date will be disregarded, 25 as
would also be the case with respect to sales not made at arm's length. 2
Clearly, then, prices obtained under forced or compulsory sales should not
be recognized 27 any more than should be true where the case discloses a
manipulated, misinformed or an exhausted market. 28 Courts will also be
reluctant to disregard market prices on the basis of argument that such
prices have been unduly affected by boom or depression, but may yield if
strong evidence can be produced to overcome such reluctance. 29 The valua23Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 381 (1931), cert. den. 284
U. S. 690, 52 S. Ct. 266, 76 L. Ed. 582 (1932) ; William Penn Hotel Co., 23 BTA 566
(1931) ; Polar Ice Cream & Supply Co., 13 BTA 1054 (1928) ; Mandel Bros., 4 BTA
341 (1926).
24 W. T. Grant Co. v. Duggan, 94 F. (2d) 859 (1938) ; Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 513 (1937) ; Commissioner v. Robertson, 75 F. (2d) 540
(1935), cert. den. 295 U. S. 763, 55 S. Ct. 922, 79 L. Ed. 1705 (1935) ; Walter v.
Duffy, 287 F. 41 (1923) ; Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Driscoll, 32 F. Supp. 661
Estate of Spencer, 5 TC 904 (1945); Augustus E. Staley, 41 BTA 752
(1940)
(1940); appeal dis. C. C. A., 7th; John J. Flynn, 35 BTA 1064 (1937).
25 True v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 720 (1943) ; Julius G. Day, 3 BTA 942 (1926).
26 Kinney's Estate v. Commissioner, 80 P. (2d) 568 (1935) ; True v. United States,
51 F. Supp. 720 (1943); Mathilde B. Hooper, 41 BTA 114 (1940) ; Gillette Rubber
Co., 31 BTA 483 (1934); Premier Packing Co., 12 BTA 637 (1928).
27 C. A. Bryan, 19 BTA 111 (1930) ; Fruen Investment Co., 2 BTA 542 (1925).
28 Zanuck v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 714 (1945) ; Andrews v. Commissioner,
135 F. (2d) 314 (1943), cert. den. 320 U. S. 748, 64 S. Ct. 51, 88 L. Ed. 444 (1943) ;
Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 876 (1945), cert. den. 328 U. S.
847, 66 S. Ct. 1118, 90 L. Ed. 1620 (1946) ; Estate of Millie Langley Wright, 43 BTA
551 (1941) ; Wallis Tractor Co., 3 BTA 981 (1926) ; John J. Batterman, T. C. Memo.
Dkt. No. 110244 (1943), affirmed in 142 F. (2d) 448 (1944), cert. den. 322 U. S. 756,
64 S. Ct. 1266, 88 L. Ed. 1585 (1944) ; Estate of Telling, T. C. Memo. Dkt. No. 106694
(1944).
29 Rogers v. Strong, 72 F. (2d) 455 (1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 621, 55 S. Ct. 217,
79 L. Ed. 709 (1934) ; Crane v. Harrison, 68 F. Supp. 439 (1946).
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tion of large blocks of stock on the basis of sales prices obtained for small
lots would be improper because of the presence of unusual factors in the
case of the former. 30 For this reason, a "blockage rule" has been formu32
lated 31 which should be taken into account.
In the absence of market valuation, stocks may be valued by com38
parison with shares of similar enterprises possessing a market sales value,
or by reference to internal data relating to the particular corporation
whose shares are involved. For this last purpose, such factors as net asset
value, earning power, dividend-paying capacity, both past and prospective,
and book value of shares may become important. Offers and options to
34
purchase shares may be considered in an effort to arrive at a fair value.
Conversely, the presence of valid restrictions on the sale of shares should
be noted for these may materially affect value by limiting the potential
market.8 5
Other securities, such as notes and mortgages, will generally be valued
on the basis of the amount of unpaid principal plus interest accrued to the
valuation date. In the case of notes, attention should be given to such
factors as (1) collectibility or subsequent actual collection, if had; (2) the
terms of the note, including the element of negotiability; and (3) the presence or absence of collateral security and the worth thereof. 36 To these
30 Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 513 (1937); Wood v. United
States, 29 F. Supp. 853 (1939) ; Estate of Vandenhoeck, 4 TC 125 (1944) ; In re
Leadbetter, TC Memo. Dkt. No. 110858 (1943).
31 Reg. 111, § 29-113(a) (14)-1; Reg. 108, § 86.14(c) ; Reg. 105, § 81.10(c).
32 See Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F. (2d) 102 (1946), cert. den. 326 U. S.
796, 66 S. Ct. 490, 90 L. Ed. 485 (1946) ; Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F. (2d) 317
(1943) ; Helvering v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 95 F. (2d) 806 (1938) :
Henry F. DuPont, 2 TC 246 (1943) ; John J. Newberry, 39 BTA 1123 (1939) ; James
Couzens, 11 BTA 1040 (1928).
33 Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U. S. 202, 35 S. Ct. 795, 59 L. Ed. 1272 (1915);
Cotton v. Commissioner, 165 F. (2d) 987 (1948) ; Horlick v. Kuhl, 62 F. Supp. 168
(1945); Frederick A. Koch, Jr., 28 BTA 363 (1933); Rose Spitzer, TC Memo. Dkt.
No. 7551 (1947). See also Reg. 108, §§ 113(a) (14) ; 811(k) ; 86.19(o) ; 29.113(a)
(14)-1; and Reg. 108, § 81.10(c).
34 Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F. (2d) 385 (1944); Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.
(2d) 682 (1932) ; Cartier v. Commissioner, 37 F. (2d) 894 (1930) ; Rice v. Eisner,
16 F. (2d) 35a (1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 764, 47 S. Ct. 477, 71 L. Ed. 880 (1927);
George B. Markle, Jr., 10 BTA 763 (1928).
a5 Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106, 56 S. Ct. 375, 80 L. Ed. 511 (1936) ; Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F. (2d) 385 (1944) ; Heiner v. Gwinner, 114 F. (2d) 723
(1940), cert. den. 311 U. S. 714, 61 S. Ct. 396, 85 L. Ed. 465 (1940) ; LaMotte T.
Cohu, 8 TC 796 (1947) ; Edith G. Goidwasser, 47 BTA 445 (1942), affirmed in 142
F. (2d) 556 (1944), cert. den. 323 U. S. 765, 65 S. Ct. 119, 89 L. Ed. 612 (1944),
rehear, den. 324 U. S. 890, 65 S. Ct. 1020, 89 L. Ed. 1437 (1945).
36 Estate of Oliver v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 210 (1945) ; McLaughlin v.
Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 611 (1940); Rusk v. Commissioner, 53 F. (2d) 428
(1931) ; Nichols v. Commissioner, 44 F. (2d) 157 (1930) ; Estate of Hodge, 2 TC
643 (1943) ; Estate of Springer, 45 BTA 561 (1941) ; Mary M. Buck, 25 BTA 780
(1932) ; I. N. Burman, 23 BTA 369 (1931) ; S. L. Meyer, 23 BTA 1201 (1931) ; John
Laing, 22 BTA 380 (1931); Paul M. Potter, TC Memo. Dkt. No. 7473 (1946) ; and
Reg. 105, § 81.10(1) ; Reg. 108, § 86.19(e).
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factors, in the case of mortgages, should be added all available information
relating to trends in the general mortgage market. 37 The worth of securities
pledged as collateral to secure indebtedness must be included in the
deceased owner's gross estate at full market value, but credit for the
outstanding indebtedness may be taken as a claim against the estate.38
This brief summary should serve to emphasize the point, previously
noted, that valuation is essentially a fact question, hence the marshalling
and preserving of all pertinent data is a matter of prime importance.
The attorney should be prepared to substantiate all valuations made with
acceptable documentary evidence as well as with convincing and admissible
testimony.
JOSEPH BRMAN *

37 Lehigh Bldg. Corp., 7 BTA 460 (1927) ; Leon N. Dibble, 6 BTA 732 (1927);
Estate of Rosenbaum, TC Memo. Dkt. No. 2711 (1944).
38 Lyman v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 811 (1936) ; Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Smith, 54 F. Supp. 579 (1940) ; Estate of Borland, 38 BTA 598 (1938) ; Reg.
105, § 81.10(c).
* LL.B., New York University, 1914; Member, New York and federal bars, New
York County Lawyers Association; former attorney, Law Department, City of
New York, and Office of Price Administration.

